This paper conceptualises foreign aid as a geopolitical form of rent in order to help distinguish the conditions under which aid is detrimental to sustained economic recovery from those where it is beneficial. Foreign aid shares with natural resource rent and contrived (i.e., government monopoly) rent the property of being a large revenue stream that is detached from the economic activity that generates it, and elicits political contests for its capture. Rent-driven models suggest such contests have two adverse effects: (i) they deflect government incentives into rent-channelling at the expense of promoting wealth creation; and (ii) the resulting political allocation of the rent distorts the economy and precipitates a growth collapse, which is protracted. In this context, the three principal causes of aid failure identified in the literature (corruption, a poor policy environment and Dutch disease effects) are all symptoms of the destabilizing impact of rent streams on immature political economies. Consequently, the deployment of foreign aid to revive collapsed economies runs the risk of perpetuating rent-seeking and thereby postponing essential economic restructuring. This paper compares the varied impacts of aid on the development trajectories of Mauritania, Kenya and Mozambique. It argues …/.
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Context
This paper starts from the premise that the political economy of rent extraction and deployment in low-income countries profoundly impacts both government incentives and the development trajectory. It conceptualizes foreign aid as a geopolitical form of rent that along with natural resource rent and contrived (government monopoly) rent is one of three key sources of rent in low-income countries. Natural resource rent is defined here as the surplus revenue from an economic activity after deducting all production costs, including a risk-related return on investment. It may be regarded as a gift from Nature, because in theory it can be taxed by governments from resource-based activity without impairing incentives to produce. Foreign aid has shared this unearned or 'windfall' characteristic, until the aid community became more discriminating through the 1990s (Collier 2006 ).
The rent from natural resources in developing countries typically comprises between one-tenth and one-fifth of GDP (World Bank 2006a, see also Table 1 ). In recent decades the scale of geopolitical rent relative to GDP in many low-income countries has matched that of natural resource rent (Svensson 2000) , while contrived rent (derived largely from government manipulation of trade policy, the exchange rate, licensing and credit) can be of similar magnitude (Krueger, Schiff and Valdes 1992) , taking the total rent within the economy to one-fifth to one-third of GDP, and more. The management of a revenue stream on such a scale, which is detached from the economic activity that generates it and is also fungible, would challenge the stability of even mature political economies.
The economic literature suggests that a high rent/GDP ratio can facilitate economic development if the rent is used to boost capital formation and if the associated foreign exchange is deployed to enhance capacity to import the capital goods required to build a modern economy. But the potential economic benefits will only accrue if the rent is deployed effectively, i.e. by a developmental political state, which after Lal (1995) is one that has both sufficient autonomy to pursue a coherent economic policy and the aim of maximizing social welfare. In the absence of such a political state, rent is likely to feed patronage networks and destabilize the political economy (Collier and Hoeffler 2006) .
Since the mid-1970s high natural resource rent in the developing economies has been linked with economic growth collapses (Sachs and Warner 1995) . Rent-driven political economy models explain that high rent triggers political contests, which within immature political states deflect government effort into redistributing rent at the expense of promoting wealth creation. The resulting rent allocation locks the economy into a staple trap of increasing dependence upon a primary commodity with diminishing competitiveness. In the absence of economic reform, which powerful rent-recipients oppose, the economy is vulnerable to shocks and a growth collapse from which recovery is protracted because the preceding cumulative distortion of the economy runs down all forms of capital. The recent growth collapses are rooted in fashionable postwar development theories that advocated intensified state intervention in the economy, but over-estimated the integrity of political states (Auty 2001) . Policies to override markets were frequently captured by vested interests and used to boost rent-seeking in ways that distorted the economy, an outcome that could be sustained for longer periods and with larger cumulative impacts in high-rent (resource-rich) countries than in lowrent countries (Table 1 and Figure 1 ). Auty (2001: 17) . 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 Resource-rich Resource-Poor Source: Auty (2005: 5) .
Foreign aid increased sharply through the 1980s to help revive the collapsed economies. Although Gomanee, Girma and Morrissey (2005) and Karras (2006) estimate that each 1 per cent rise in the aid/GNP ratio raises per capita GDP growth by 0.14-0.25 per cent, 1 the provision of geopolitical rent to revive collapsed resource-rich economies invariably 3 disappointed (see Figure 1 and Svenssen 2000). The literature disputes whether the modest outcome is because rent feeds corruption (Boone 1996) , causes political instability (Islam 2005) or triggers Dutch disease effects (Rajan and Subramanian 2005) . This paper argues that all three 'causes' are symptoms of the destabilizing political competition that aid triggers in immature political states as a large and fungible revenue rent.
In assessing the efficiency of foreign aid during the period 1971-90, Boone (1996) finds that it did not increase the investment rate in recipient countries, but went mostly into boosting consumption and expanding the scale of government. Nor did this increased consumption benefit the poor in any of three different types of political state that Boone analysed (autocratic, egalitarian and oligarchic laissez-faire). Burnside and Dollar (2000) seek to refine the gloomy conclusion that the elite capture foreign aid. They argue that although aid has no discernible effect on countries with maladroit policies it has a strong positive effect on countries pursuing sound policies regarding fiscal balance and trade openness. Burnside and Dollar (2000) receive little support, however, from subsequent research (Hansen and Tarp 2001; Islam 2005; Rajan and Subramanian 2005) . Islam (2005) finds that although sound policies are a necessary condition for growth, they are not sufficient in the absence of political stability, which is required to encourage investment. In the absence of political stability, aid is likely to be dissipated in unproductive consumption, much as Boone describes. Svensson (2000) confirms that for countries with weak political institutions, increases in foreign aid exacerbate corruption because much of the aid feeds rent-seeking activity. Collier and Hoeffler (2005) warn that aid is more likely to be dissipated through rent-seeking in democracies with weak political accountability than in autocratic political states. Rajan and Subramanian (2005) identify a third channel for aid's adverse impact: they find that domestic expenditure of overseas aid within the public sector triggers Dutch disease effects that constrain labour-intensive manufacturing growth (whereas expenditure of private sector remittances does not). 2 This finding echoes that of Bevan, Collier and Gunning (1987) that windfall natural resource rent is less likely to be saved and also invested effectively when it is concentrated on governments than when it is diffused across many economic agents. Similarly, Gelb and Associates (1988) demonstrate that the concentration of the 1974-78 and 1979-81 oil windfalls on governments led to over-rapid domestic absorption of the rent that triggered Dutch disease and rent-seeking, which depressed economy-wide investment efficiency.
The three identified 'causes' of malfunctioning aid are interlinked: rents trigger contests that feed corruption, distort policy and cause over-rapid rent absorption (amplifying Dutch disease effects). This is not the case for all forms of aid, however, so the argument must be further nuanced: if foreign aid flows are disaggregated, some forms are less prone to political capture. For example, Collier (2006) finds that foreign aid outcomes have improved in Sub-Saharan Africa since the 1980s compared with oil rent outcomes due to a learning curve that has directed rent into economies that demonstrate 5 the capacity to use it effectively and also into applications that are subject to public accountability. He suggests that whereas oil rent lowers the share of government revenue from taxation, which is scrutinized, relative to 'sovereign' revenue that is not scrutinized, foreign aid may be subject to adequate scrutiny if it is channelled to: technical assistance; projects that are subjected to competitive tender; programmes managed by governments with proven records of effective deployment; and forgiveness of debt that can never be serviced. Mavrotas and Ouattara (2006) also qualify the differential impact of aid modalities: they report with reference to Côte d'Ivoire during 1975-99 that increased programme aid boosts investment (that can be monitored) and also lowers government consumption, whereas higher project aid boosts government consumption (as do technical aid and food aid) but shrinks investment.
This paper applies two rent-driven political economy models to compare the development trajectories of Mauritania, Kenya and Mozambique in order to distinguish the conditions under which geopolitical rent is detrimental to sustained economic recovery from those where it is beneficial. It finds that aid can reinforce the strong inertia of rent-seeking and retard essential economic restructuring but that the selective deployment of aid as part of a dual track reform strategy can improve outcomes. The paper proceeds by introducing rent-driven political economy models in section 2. The models are then applied to explain why streams of geopolitical rent have been counterproductive in Mauritania and Kenya in sections 3 and 4, respectively. Section 5 explains the mainly beneficial outcome of rent deployment in Mozambique. Section 6 sets out the policy implications.
High-rent and low-rent political economy models
The low-rent competitive industrialization model and the high-rent staple trap model demonstrate how differences in the scale of natural resource rent affect the incentives of the political state and the development trajectory (see Auty 2007) . The competitive industrialization model provides a useful comparator for the high-rent staple trap model. It shows that low rent motivates governments to create wealth because the principal means of increasing revenue is through the taxation of a dynamic economy. The interests of the elite align with those of the majority poor in the provision of public goods and maintenance of efficiency incentives in order to generate wealth for the government to tax. These incentives yield an autocracy that is benign rather than predatory (Table 2) ; an oligarchy that is self-liquidating (as early competitive industrialization (described below) triggers rapid social change that proliferates competing interest groups able to form alliances to check policy capture by any one faction); and a democracy that is consensual (reflecting public satisfaction with policies that bring rapid socioeconomic gain).
In contrast, high rent increases the ratio of 'sovereign' revenue relative to tax revenue and sparks political contests for its capture that deflect government effort into revenue distribution at the expense of promoting wealth creation, an outcome that foreign aid can perpetuate. Rent confers immediate (often personal) gain on governments whereas the benefits from wealth creation are deferred and may therefore accrue to the government's successors. The high-rent incentives render an autocracy likely to be predatory (Table 2) ; whereas an oligarchy will remain concentrated (in the absence of rapid structural and social change); and a democracy will be polarized because the high income inequality associated with resource-rich economies (explained below) polarizes political parties between income redistribution and the status quo, so that change in government brings large swings in policy that deter investment.
Differences in rent also affect the development trajectory. The short dependence upon commodity exports of low-rent economies triggers industrialization at a relatively low per capita income, so the industry is labour-intensive and also competitive in the absence of rent subsidies. The resulting development trajectory (the shaded column in Figure 2 ) triggers virtuous economic and political circles. The economic circle sees early industrialization bring early urbanization, which accelerates passage through the demographic cycle so population growth slows sooner than in high-rent countries, and the falling dependency/worker ratio raises the share of investment in GDP relative to consumption. The expansion of labour-intensive manufacturing also absorbs surplus rural labour and encourages diversification into skill-intensive and capital-intensive manufacturing to boost labour productivity. In the absence of rent subsidies this diversification is competitive and boosts the resilience of the economy. It also proliferates market-oriented firms that shrink the scope for rent-seeking and maintain the efficiency of investment so economic growth is rapid and can double per capita GDP every seven to ten years.
In addition to encouraging wealth-generation, competitive industrialization spawns a virtuous political circle that maintains a relatively egalitarian income distribution. This is because the early elimination of surplus labour puts a floor under the wages of the poor while the rapid expansion of skills caps the skill premium. Moreover, sustained rapid per capita GDP growth strengthens three sanctions against anti-social governance (Auty 2007) as: (i) taxation soon diversifies away from commodity exports towards income, profit and expenditure taxes and strengthens demands for the political accountability of public spending; (ii) early competitive industrialization generates self- help social capital that strengthens civic voice; and (iii) the proliferation of competitive enterprises intensifies demands for the rule of law and property rights to protect investment returns. These pressures yield an incremental and endogenous democratization as they propel the political state from a benign autocracy through a diffusing oligarchy to a consensual democracy (Table 2 ).
In contrast, the high-rent economy's longer dependence on rent from primary exports aborts competitive diversification and locks the economy into a staple trap. The development trajectory (the shaded column in Figure 3 ) skips labour-intensive manufacturing with three adverse consequences. First, later industrialization retards urbanization and delays passage through the demographic cycle so the dependent/worker ratio remains high and consumption continues to absorb a high share of GDP. Second, late manufacturing is capital-intensive so it fails to absorb surplus rural labour so that income inequality widens. The resultant social tensions encourage governments to subsidize employment by using rent to protect infant industry and overexpand the bureaucracy. The expansion of the subsidized sector depresses the economywide efficiency of capital, so that economic growth decelerates. Third, entrepreneurial talent is misallocated because lobbying for government favours is more remunerative than investing in productive activity.
The expanding subsidized sector outstrips the rent as the relative size of the primary sector contracts, due to either on-going structural change or shifting terms of trade. But 8 rent-seekers block economic reform so governments find it politically expedient to raise revenue in addition to the rent by extracting the returns to capital and labour from the primary sector as well as the rent. This depresses incentives in the primary sector and saps its viability even as the rest of the economy increases its dependence upon it. This staple trap trajectory of increasing dependence on a primary commodity with declining competitiveness renders the economy vulnerable to shocks and a growth collapse from which recovery is protracted. This is partly because the cumulative misallocation of investment causes all forms of capital to run down and partly because rent-seekers exhibit strong inertia by exerting their political muscle to oppose market reform because it shrinks their rent-extracting opportunities.
The high-rent staple trap trajectory also weakens incentives to build sanctions against anti-social governance because rent recipients make fewer demands for political accountability than taxpayers do; social capital is dependent on state largesse, a condition that discourages civic voice; and entrepreneurs lobby government officials for favours instead of pushing for competitive markets, property rights and the rule of law. Tornell and Lane (1999) demonstrate that economies with powerful elites grow more slowly than those in which elites wield less power: in the presence of powerful groups, oil and coffee booms sharply increase government expenditure and debt, and also double the share of transfers in GDP. Where power is diffused among many groups, growth is faster. This is consistent with the low-rent competitive industrialization model, in which structural change proliferates interest groups so that autocracies and oligarchies self-destruct and diffuse into democracies.
This paper argues that the provision of geopolitical rent to revive resource-rich economies after a growth collapse can perpetuate distortion of the political economy by feeding rent-seeking, easing pressure for reform and retarding economic restructuring. The consequences include corruption, a poor policy environment and Dutch disease effects. The next three sections compare the rent streams, government incentives and development outcomes for the three case study countries, commencing with Mauritania.
Sustained high geopolitical rent and Dutch disease in Mauritania
For three decades, Mauritania has received a rent stream of around one-third of GDP, mostly from geopolitical rent (Table 3) . Prior to that, rent from an expanding new iron ore mine had triggered rapid economic growth through the 1960s. Barely 2 per cent of Mauritania's one million inhabitants were urbanized then, three-quarters being herders scattered across one million square kilometres of arid land and one-quarter being farmers beside the Senegal River (Cour 2004) . Mining generated two-thirds of modern sector income and 80 per cent of exports by 1974, when foreign aid quadrupled to onequarter of GNI to help Mauritania adjust to the 1973 oil shock. Aid persisted at that level with minor fluctuations (Table 3) . Subsequently, a fishing agreement with the EU conferred quasi-rents that were worth 8 per cent of GDP by the early 2000s. This sustained, large and weakly monitored rent stream has been associated with low transparency in public finances; severe Dutch disease effects and a dominant rent-driven urban economy. These are unpropitious pre-conditions for managing an oil boom that is projected to generate an extra 25 per cent of GDP annually in public revenue during 2007-16. As a consequence of IMF conditionality, Mauritania restored a nominal democracy in 1993, after suspending it in 1978. The elite maintained power by channelling rent through a clientelistic system so that regime change occurred through military coups rather than elections. The government that ruled for two decades until May 2005 won three elections during 1993-2003 with over two-thirds of the vote by using public office to co-opt tribal leaders and fracture the opposition. The rapid rotation of office conferred short tenure that encouraged maximum rent siphoning, however, which some estimates put at one-quarter of public revenue. The elite exploited the IMF and ODA as sources of rent. For a decade prior to 2004, the government secretly ran off-budget expenditures substantially in excess of those reported to the IMF so the national accounts since 1995 are now being revised to determine how the economy actually performed. The governance indices in Table 4 are little better than those of Malawi, a country with one-third of Mauritania's per capita GDP.
In addition to feeding corruption, Mauritania's rent-driven clientelism also engendered a dependent form of social capital that looked to the government and extended family for sustenance. It was common practice for poorer relatives to migrate from the countryside and expect their wealthier urban relatives to provide for them until they found a government job or other employment. This passive social capital contrasts with the resilient self-help and civic voice of the competitive industrialization model.
Mauritania's rent-driven economy also exhibits pronounced Dutch disease effects. The share of agriculture in GDP contracted after the mid-1970s' growth collapse (Table 5) , although stagnant per capita GDP (Table 6 ) would be expected to have stabilized its share. The IMF (2005a) estimates the share of agriculture in GDP at 16 per cent in 2004, barely half that expected for a country at Mauritania's level of development while manufacturing is two-thirds the size expected. Agriculture employs more than half the workforce but generates only one-sixth of GDP, half of which is subsistence. Barely half the herding subsector's 12 per cent of GDP is commercialized while cropping exhibits even more neglect: it generates a meagre 4 per cent of GDP, one-quarter of which is commercial, but it employs three-quarters of the rural workforce. Yet Mauritania's 150,000 irrigable hectares, if integrated with improved livestock management and roads to access markets, could lift agriculture's share of GDP above the expected one-third level. , 1960-2004 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995- This disappointing outcome reflects the fact that the aid-dominated rent stream eased pressure for politically risky economic reform until rising foreign debt necessitated IMF help in the 1990s. 3 The resulting prolonged rural neglect denied most Mauritanians the opportunity to acquire the assets and skills required to take advantage of a market economy. In addition, their low incomes conferred not only sizable welfare losses but also a substantial loss of purchasing power that in the early stages of economic development stimulates the local supply of basic manufactured goods and services (Mellor 1976) . Moreover, the remarkably low commercial farm output cut the sector's capacity to stimulate agro-processing, which is also a key feature of early industrialization.
The corollary of rural neglect is a rent-cycling urban sector, centred upon the capital Nouakchott, which generates three-fifths of GDP and houses one-third of the population (Cour 2004) . Large private trading monopolies and inefficient state-owned water and electricity companies are permitted to skim rent from the urban economy at the expense of domestic private producers whose margins are shrunk by high-cost water and intermittent power as well as by expensive transport that reflects a haulage monopoly, unpaved arterial roads and the inefficiency of Nouakchott port. The monopolies also dominate bank credit at the expense of small private firms, whose perceived 'high risk' elicits interest rates of 20 per cent or more. Large commercial monopolies reserve domestic markets for imports like German dairy products and Dutch onions, even when local producers are cheaper. The monopolies, whether public or private, are indifferent to inflation and the exchange rate because they can pass costs on to their captive markets. If expanding oil rent is not to further distort Mauritania's political economy and end in a growth collapse, safeguards proposed in section 6 must be adopted.
Geopolitical rent retards Kenya's competitive industrialization
Failure to sustain GDP growth and thereby pass through the demographic transition expanded Kenya's population six-fold during 1948-2004 and transformed Kenya from a resource-rich economy into a resource-poor one (World Bank 1963 . The rentdriven models predict that the resulting fall in resource rent would eventually provide incentives to diversify the economy into competitive manufacturing, as in Mauritius after it exhausted its land frontier in the 1960s. Yet although at independence in 1963 the Kenyan economy had already developed a sizeable export-oriented manufacturing sector upon which to build, industrial competitiveness subsequently regressed. This section argues that rent from agriculture subsidized this regression and then foreign aid (Table 3) helped to perpetuate it.
The Kenyan elite initially supported open trade to facilitate export production from the large landholdings they acquired from white settlers at independence, which policy also constrained rent-seeking. However in 1968 the elite amended the law in order to acquire urban manufacturing and importing businesses (Bates 1983), activities that were already major sources of contrived rent extraction elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa (Bigsten 1993 ). This triggered a drift into protectionist policies that shifted the internal terms of 12 trade in favour of manufacturing and against agriculture. By 1984, subsidies to manufacturing comprised 60 per cent of its value added (7 per cent of total GDP) and absorbed 28 per cent of the previous twenty years' growth in farm output (Sharpley and Lewis 1990) . The share of exports in manufacturing output regressed to 10 per cent by the early 1980s compared with 40 per cent in the mid-1960s. A coffee boom during 1976-79 conferred extra rent equivalent to 8 per cent of GDP annually (Cuddington 1989) , which the Kenyan government squeezed from farmers, leaving them with only one-third of world prices to cover their costs (World Bank 2003: 44) . Other crops subject to state predation like maize and sugar also lost viability whereas less regulated crops like tea and horticulture did not.
When the coffee boom faded, external debt became unsustainable and Kenya's growth collapsed: the rate of per capita GDP growth, which averaged 2.8 per cent annually during the 1960s and 1970s, fell to 0.3 per cent during the 1980s and -0.5 per cent in the 1990s (Table 6 ). Although the growth collapse not only depressed incomes but also intensified pressure on natural resources, the economy still failed to diversify into competitive manufacturing (Table 5 ) because rent-seekers undermined governance and derailed IMF-backed trade liberalization efforts (Table 4) . Increased aid facilitated rentseeking by allowing the successor to Kenya's founding president (who died in 1978) to play off the dominant tribes against each other and maintain a political coalition of smaller tribes in the western rift valley (Ndegwa 2003) . The new leader shored up his coalition by drawing on geopolitical rent, which more than doubled to 11.4 per cent of GNI annually during 1986-95, peaking at 13.6 per cent in the early-1990s (Table 3 ). The aid was inadequately targeted and officials and businessmen extracted rent through scams, including one that recycled four hundred million dollars through fictitious mineral exports (Economist 2006) . Aid did raise per capita GDP slightly but it was also associated with Dutch disease effects that halved agriculture's share of GDP (Table 5) . Donors eventually responded in the 1990s by cutting aid to 4 per cent of GNI, causing incomes to fall, but the government was still re-elected in 1997, albeit with barely twofifths of the vote, courtesy of a fractured opposition.
The cumulative welfare loss from postponed economic restructuring has been considerable: Kenya's mean per capita GDP growth rate during 1960-2000 of 1.5 per cent is 3.5 per cent slower than the high-performing Asian economies although Kenya's lower per capita income implies its underlying growth potential was 1.5 per cent higher than the Asian economies (World Bank 2003: 29) . Although the ruling party finally lost power in 2002 to a fifteen-party coalition that captured two-thirds of the vote, the welfare losses are likely to persist because rent-seeking exhibits strong inertia. When donors expanded aid to encourage economic reform the new government muted its attacks on corruption and reverted to rent-seeking to balance factions within its diverse coalition, as some observers had predicted (Ndegwa 2003) .
Targeting geopolitical rent on wealth creation in Mozambique
In contrast to Mauritania and Kenya, geopolitical rent in Mozambique has been relatively successful. Efforts to restructure the Mozambique economy after it had been distorted by a failed experiment with central planning and years of civil strife, attracted unusually high flows of foreign aid, which averaged 42.4 per cent of GNI annually during 1987 GNI annually during -2003 (Table 3) . Aid lifted Mozambique's investment rate to more than double the expected level, at almost 50 per cent of GDP, and expanded import capacity, removing a severe constraint on growth (de Sousa and Sulemane 2003) . The rent stream triggered a strong economic recovery from the mid-1990s after resurgent civil strife ended (Table 5) . It is also associated with a revival of democracy and creditably high indices of governance for a country with Mozambique's per capita income (Table 4) . These favourable outcomes appear to reflect the scrutiny of public expenditure by a credible political opposition and also donor preference for financing import-intensive investment that it could monitor.
The restoration of democracy produced two relatively evenly matched political parties that drew support from the rival contestants in the civil war, so unlike Mauritania and Kenya the opposition was not fragmented and initially at least presented a credible threat to the ruling party. In addition, donors targeted aid at investment, which they could more effectively monitor than general budget support or current consumption. The investment drew on surplus domestic labour and was import-intensive. Adam and Bevan (2003) find with reference to Uganda that aid directed at import-rich infrastructure, which boosts the productivity of private sector activity, limits Dutch disease effects.
Targeted aid within a contested polity may also help to explain why Mozambique's stabilization policy succeeded in the late 1990s. Successful stabilization, boosted by generous tax exemptions, elicited a large inflow of FDI into capital-intensive projects, notably a US$2.2 billion aluminium smelter. The inflow renewed fears of Dutch disease that proved unfounded and during the construction phase 1999-2003 the real exchange rate actually fell from 76 per cent of its 1990 value to 60 per cent (IMF 2003: 27) . But the foreign investment created few long-term jobs and boosted urban growth, mostly in the far south of the country. Although agriculture sustains 80 per cent of the workforce and grew at 6.6 per cent annually during 1996-2004, its share of GDP declined as heavy industry and tourism grew faster (IMF 2005b: 7) . Nevertheless, the rate of rural poverty fell from 71 per cent in 1996 to 55 per cent in 2003, paralleling the national drop, which the IMF (2005b: 12-13) attributes to rapid GDP growth, some gain in market access for farmers and also broad-based advances in education and health.
Adams and Bevan (2003) warn, however, that aid targeted at infrastructure amplifies income inequality because it benefits urban households more than rural households. The resumption of rapid per capita GDP growth in Mozambique did not boost domestic consumption proportionately. This is partly because the withdrawal of geopolitical rent channelled much of the extra output into debt service and exports rather than into consumption (Personal communication, A. Gelb 2003) . But it also reflects a longstanding urban policy bias that retards economic restructuring. Central planning had initially stressed heavy industry and large-scale agriculture at the expense of peasant farming and even before the FDI inflow, agriculture generated 8 per cent less GDP than expected for an economy at Mozambique's level of development, whereas industry produced 9 per cent more than expected (Tarp et al. 2002: 12) . As in Mauritania, many farmers in Mozambique lacked market access and so could not take advantage of economic improvements. Although the fraction of smallholders engaging in markets doubled during 1996-2005, the ratio remained at barely one-quarter (IMF 2005b: 12) .
Farmers need all-weather tertiary roads if they are to emerge from subsistence production and capture the productivity and environmental gains from crop specialization (Tiffin and Mortimore 1994) . 4 Yet government and donors in Mozambique concentrated transport investment on primary roads (Tarp et al. 2002: 108) , which bridge space between cities, rather than open it up for development. Despite the strong aid-led rebound, 60 per cent of Mozambique's population remain illiterate, one-third lack access to health care and one-eighth are HIV positive. Moreover, as with other regional aid recipients like Uganda and Rwanda (IMF 2005b: 34) , weak tax enforcement leaves Mozambique taxation at 12.5 per cent of GDP, half the target level. Unfortunately, Mozambique government officials increasingly rely on aid to substitute for domestic public revenue, which they siphon away for personal gain (Hanlon 2004) . The country's graft index deteriorated from -0.47 to -0.68 during 2002-04, although rising incomes should have brought improvement (World Bank 2006b). The consolidation of aid within the overall budget risks feeding this constituency rather than strengthening overall policy coherence, as intended.
As aid and donor influence wane, sustained development in Mozambique requires the mainly rural electorate to cohere in resisting policy capture by emerging urban rentseeking interests. Fortunately, the economic case for supporting the rural economy is strong: an IFPRI simulation finds that as aid shrinks the strongest growth potential lies in agriculture because it is less adversely affected by the resulting cuts in public investment and import compression than either construction or urban services (Tarp et al. 2002: 76-85) . The IMF (2005b: 16) concurs, stressing the need to promote labourintensive growth and encourage new business formation.
Conclusions
The scale of natural resource and geopolitical rent in low-income countries is large in aggregate, ranging in recent decades from 20-33 per cent of GDP and more. Rent is detached from the activity that generates it and on this scale has strong potential to destabilize the political economy in immature political systems. The numerous growth collapses in resource-rich developing countries during 1974-85 reflect this process (Figure 1 ). They stem from fashionable policies to override markets through the 1950s and 1960s that inadvertently increased the risk that rent-seeking groups would capture natural resource rent and contrived rent to the detriment of sustained long-term wealth creation. The higher the rent the longer that maladroit rent deployment continued and the greater the distortion of the political economy. The provision of foreign aid to restructure collapsed economies risks perpetuating this distortion of the political economy if it merely provides a stream of geopolitical rent.
Kenya dramatically shows how such growth collapses retard the demographic transition and accelerate the shift towards resource scarcity. But although rent-driven models predict this condition will self-correct by motivating governments to create wealth and by shifting the development trajectory into competitive industrialization, this did not occur in either Kenya or Mauritania. The reason appears to be that rent-seekers treat aid as additional rent. They undermine reform to restructure of the economy and promote political accountability because they prosper from a distorted economy and lose if competitive markets expand. Rajan and Zingales (2006) warn that institutional reform may not be sufficient to achieve development-enhancing change in the absence of supportive political constituencies. Consequently, the political economy should inform reform policies and reformers should ensure they build political constituencies to back such policies. A critical implication of the damaging inertia of rent-seeking is the utility of a dual track development strategy (which successful economies as varied as China, Malaysia, Mauritius and the UAE have pursued). The dual track strategy weans as fast as is feasible an increasing fraction of the economy off patronage-channelled rent distribution and into market-guided wealth creation. Track one creates a dynamic market economy that inflicts minimal immediate costs on the elite. In creating a dynamic market, track one also builds an increasingly powerful political lobby in favour of economy-wide reform. Meanwhile, track two promotes reform of the rent-driven (usually urban) economy, but slowly, in recognition of the political risk to the survival of reforming governments if they tackle vested interests head-on. In all three case studies analysed here, a dual track strategy would strengthen the large rural constituency that has much to contribute to early economic development, not least as a political check on urban rent-seeking, but it can do so only if ethnic factionalism does not fragment the rural vote.
